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 A B S T R A C T 
 
Using ORBIS company micro-level data, this paper discussed 
the effectiveness of anti-avoidance regulation in tackling 
outbound profit shifting in ASEAN  for the period from 2009 – 
2018.  This paper found that the elasticity of outbound profit 
shifting to positive tax rate differential is roughly 1.82%, where 
anti-avoidance effect brings back to profit by 0.55%, Our 
findings suggest that a moderately strong anti-avoidance level 
is effective to reduce profit shifting. In contrast, a stringent 
anti-avoidance level leads to a decreasing effect. 
 
Dengan menggunakan data mikro yang disediakan oleh ORBIS, 
penelitian ini ini mencoba mengukur tingkat efektivitas 
peraturan anti penghindaran pajak di ASEAN dalam mencegah 
pergeseran laba keluar negeri pada periode 2009 – 2018. 
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa tingkat elastisitas atas 
pergeseran laba keluar negeri terhadap perbedaan tarif pajak 
adalah 1,.82%, dimana efek aturan anti penghindaran pajak 
dapat mencegah pergeseran profit sebesar hanya sebesar 
0.55%, Selain itu, thesis ini juga menyimpulkan bahwa 
peraturan anti penghindaran pajak dengan tingkat menengah 
sudah cukup untuk mencegah pergeseran laba. Di lain pihak, 
aturan yang terlalu ketat akan menurunkan efektivitas 
peraturan anti penghindaran pajak.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The tax policy is the sovereignty of each country in 
the world. A Country could choose the level of the tax 
rate, which they think is optimum (Gurria, 2014). In 
setting the tax rate, the country considers the rate that 
in line with its economic policy, sometimes by 
sacrificing tax revenue (Compact, 2013).  For example, 
the rate is set low enough to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) (van Apeldoorn, 2018). That is why the 
tax rates in each country vary. This condition creates 
differences in tax rates in every country in the world. 
 
The differences in tax rates between countries not 
only work as an incentive for FDI but also a motivation 
for Multinational Enterprise (“MNE”) to do profit 
shifting. Profit Shifting is a strategy used by 
multinational companies to exploit loopholes and tax 
rate differences across jurisdictions by artificially shift 
profits to lower or no tax jurisdictions without any 
economic or business reason. By shifting the profit from 
high tax countries to low tax countries, Multinational 
Enterprises able to maximize their global profit after 
tax. 
 
The practice of profit shifting distorts competition 
between multinationals and domestics companies, 
decreases tax fair ness, reduces tax revenue, creates 
inefficient capital allocation, and negatively impacts 
economic growth (Overesch, 2007) (Gurria, 2014). 
Thus, in order to tackle profit shifting, countries have 
designed a set of tax regulation, which called Anti-Tax 
Avoidance regulation (“Anti Avoidance”) (Miller & Ifs, 
2016). The anti-avoidance is a set of tax policies that 
aim to tackle the practice of tax avoidance.  
 
This paper discusses the empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of anti-avoidance regulation in ASEAN 
countries from 2009 to 2018. Moreover, this paper 
attempts to quantify the strength of anti-avoidance 
regulation in ASEN using the methodology designed by 
Johansson  (Johansson & Sorbe, 2016). 
 
1.1. Multinational Enterprises And Profit Shifting 
 
A Multinational Enterprise (“MNE”) is a group of 
two or more companies that are located and operate in 
different jurisdictions (OECD, 2015b). By having 
operated in different jurisdictions, MNEs can exploit 
different statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates. 
The difference in the CIT rate between countries 
creates the opportunity for an MNE to maximize its 
global profit by lowering tax paid (Armstrong, Blouin, & 
Larcker, 2012) (Omar & Zolkaflil, 2015) (Ratan, 2015).  
 
MNE uses strategy by shifting profit from a high 
tax jurisdiction to a low or nil tax jurisdiction 
(Johansson, Skeie, Sorbe, & Menon, 2017) 
(Dharmapala, 2014a). To illustrate, imagine Company 
A, which located in 25% tax rate jurisdiction transacts 
with affiliated company B in other countries, which has 
a tax rate of 17%. Company A sells $100 goods to 
company B. Without profit shifting, the overall group 
tax is $8.4, while with only $10 profit shifting, the group 
tax reduced to $7.60, resulting in $0.80 tax saving. 
  
Entity 
Without 
Profit 
Shifting 
With Profit 
Shifting ($10) 
Company A 
Revenue $ 100 $ 90 
Cost + Expense $ 80  $ 80  
Profit $ 20 $ 10 
Tax 25% $ 5  $ 2     
Company B 
Revenue $ 120 $ 120 
Cost + Expense $ 100  $ 90 
Profit $ 20 $ 30  
Tax 17% $ 3.40  $ 5    
Group Tax 
Burden 
$ 8.40  $ 7.60  
Tax Savings 
 
$ 0.80  
Figure 1 Profit Shifting Mechanism  
 
Practically, profit shifting can be done in various 
forms (Johansson et al., 2017).  First, an MNE may 
conduct related party transactions (transfer pricing), in 
which the price agreed is deviating from the market 
price (arm’s length price).  
 
Second, MNE may design excessive deductible 
interest expense through an intra-group loan. The 
strategy knows as a thin-capitalization. 
 
Third, MNE may use a Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (CFC). This strategy allows MNE to park 
undistributed profit in low tax jurisdiction. 
 
Fourth, MNE able to design aggressive tax 
arrangement which does not have the business 
motivation, and only intended to obtain a tax benefit. 
Company A 
Country A 
 (Tax: 25%) 
Other Countries 
(Tax: 17%)  
Company B 
Selling Good at 
$100 
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These arrangements exploit the potential tax loopholes 
across the country.  
 
Last but not least, MNE able to exploit the tax 
treaty network between countries. For example, by 
exploiting the withholding tax on passive income or the 
determination of permanent establishment. 
 
MNE’s profit shifting behavior receives concern 
from governments around the world. It is a problem 
because it lowers government revenue (Clausing, 
2015). OECD calculates that the global tax revenue loss 
is between $100 Million to $240 Million annually from 
profit shifting (OECD, 2015a). However, the problem is 
not how massive the tax revenue loss is (Ratan, 2015), 
but the main negative implication is the fairness of the 
tax regulation (Dharmapala, 2014a). Because only MNE 
who have access to profit shifting, while Domestic 
Enterprises do not. It is, therefore, arising problems in 
the fairness of tax regulation and competition 
(Buettner, Overesch, & Wamser, 2018)(Sam & Haufler, 
2005). In the long term, profit shifting creates an 
inefficient allocation of resources, hence distorts the 
capital and labor’s rate of return (Overesch, 2007).  
 
In current days, policymakers around the world 
interested in the discussion on how to design effective 
tax policies to combat profit shifting (Dharmapala, 
2014c). However, only a few of these efforts have been 
very successful since they did not aim for the 
fundamental problem. The problem lies in the 
mismatch of every countries tax policy design. Some 
countries do set their low rate to attract FDI (OECD, 
2007) while sacrificing tax revenues. Empirical evidence 
shows that countries with a low tax rate might be the 
destination for inbound profit shifting (Devereux & 
Griffith, 2003) (Kelly & Graziani, 2015), while countries 
with higher tax might face outbound profit shifting 
(Sam & Haufler, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, over some mismatches that occur, 
there is a pattern of uniformity in designing tax policy 
to tackle profit shifting. This set of tax policy known as 
anti-avoidance (Miller & Ifs, 2016) (Nations, 2017). 
OECD (OECD, 2013) explains five dimensions of anti-
avoidance as follows:  
1. Transfer Pricing Regulation. The regulation 
requires the transaction between related entities 
in MNE should be following the arm’s length price, 
which is comparable to the market price. The 
regulation also requires individual MNE to provide 
documentation of the application of the arm’s 
length principle. The most important is the 
regulation authorizes the tax authority to make a 
price adjustment if the price has been proven to 
deviate from the arm’s length principle (OECD, 
2015d). However, the level of strictness and 
documentation requirements is different among 
jurisdictions. 
2. Thin Capitalization Regulation. The regulation 
limits the excessive interest expense if specific 
criteria are fulfilled. The excessive criteria may vary 
across the countries. In practice, The criterion can 
be in the form of a ratio of debt to equity, or a 
specific percentage of interest to earning (OECD, 
2015c).  
3. Control Foreign Corporation (CFC) Regulation. The 
regulation aims to bring back the income which 
parked in foreign countries using a mechanism 
called deemed dividends. However, the regulation 
is not compatible with certain tax policies, which 
means that it is not applicable in every country. 
4. General Anti Avoidance Regulation (GAAR). The 
regulation disallows the benefit derived from a tax-
motivated scheme which considered aggressive. 
The regulation specifically targeted to counter a 
broad scope of profit shiting. A common practice is 
to deny the benefit from a transaction that does 
not have economic substance (Johansson & Sorbe, 
2016). However, it is difficult in practice, and it is 
highly reliant on the mellowness of tax authority. 
5. Tax Treaty Network and Withholding Tax Rate. 
Even though this is not anti-avoidance regulation, 
but it influences MNE behavior in a country. Since 
the more tax treaties the country has, then the 
more prone to profit-shifting. For example, MNE 
could exploit the tax treaty benefit, such as a 
reduced tariff in the withholding tax rate 
(Johansson & Sorbe, 2016). 
 
From the MNE perspective, anti-avoidance is 
increasing the cost of profit-shifting (Dharmapala, 
2014b), and increase future tax burden expectation 
(Ruf & Schindler, 2015) (Mcclure, Lanis, & Govendir, 
2016).  Moreover, the anti-avoidance may also increase 
the reputational cost of MNE, since it increases the 
probability of being audit (Dharmapala, 2014a) 
(Gallemore, Maydew, & Thornock, 2014).  
 
1.2. Research Question and Gap 
 
Despite the uniformity of the five dimensions of 
anti-avoidance, the mismatches still exist. Precisely, the 
mismatches lie in determining the level of strengths 
and the level of enforcement (Johansson & Sorbe, 
2016). Some of anti-avoidance is only serving as a 
formality, specifically for low tax country. Since low tax 
country is possibly the destination of inbound profit 
shifting, and gain benefit from that (Lohse, Riedel, & 
Spengel, 2014) (Gresik, 2008).   
 
Therefore, the implementation of different anti-
avoidance in countries in the world relies on what 
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becomes the priority,  is it tax revenues or is it FDI. 
Consequently, countries rarely apply the entire set of 
antiavoidance. Some countries only apply rules which 
they consider essential, while some implement the 
entire set of antiavoidance combined with FDI 
incentives. 
 
However, the big question is whether the 
application of a full-set and complicated anti-avoidance 
has a positive impact on tax revenue. Besides, whether 
the application of complete tax avoidance will 
effectively reduce the profit shifting practices of MNE,  
it remains to be answered. As an economist, I was 
challenged to research in this field,  so later we can 
answer one day that whether the application of a 
complete and robust anti-avoidance will significantly 
reduce the practice of profit shifting, or it will bring the 
opposite effect. 
 
This paper will focus on the evaluation of the anti-
avoidance implementation of ASEAN. Some 
considerations are taken into account in determining 
why I choose ASEAN. First, tax rates in ASEAN are varied 
considerably and create a supportive environment for 
profit-shifting, not only among ASEAN countries but 
also with countries outside ASEAN. Second, the 
application of anti-avoidance in ASEAN has a diversity 
level because what becomes a priority in setting tax 
rates for each country is different. Last, there was still a 
few research that focused on anti-avoidance 
effectiveness, specifically in ASEAN. So, the field is still 
promising for future research. 
 
To be able to measure the effectiveness of anti-
avoidance, this paper will take two steps. First, 
measuring the index of anti-avoidance robustness. The 
second step is to measure the profit-shifting elasticity 
to differences in tax rates. After that, the two results 
will be integrated into an estimation equation to 
evaluate the effectiveness of anti-avoidance on profit 
shifting. 
 
Further, the evaluation of anti-avoidance covered  
several dimension as follows (Johansson & Sorbe, 
2016): 
1. The robustness of Transfer Pricing Regulation and 
Documentation; 
2. The strictness of Thin Capitalization Regulation; 
3. The Implementation General Anti Avoidance 
Regulation (GAAR); 
4. The Implementation Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (CFC) Regulation; 
5. The Tax Treaty Network and Withholding Tax Rate. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
We begin the literature review starting from the 
research on the elasticity of profit-shifting. The first 
who pioneered the study of profit shifting was Grubert 
and Mutti (Grubert & Mutti, 1991) and also Hines and 
Rice (Hines & Rice, 1994). The fundamental theory is 
that reported (observed) profit is a summation of real 
profit and shifted profit. Where shifted profit can be 
positive (inbound shifting) or negative (outbound 
shifting) (Dharmapala, 2014c). The shifted profit is a 
response to the incentive for profit shifting, wherein 
Hines and Rice define as the tax rate difference is 
between foreign parent countries and observation 
countries. Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
for the year 1982 aggregate country-level data, Hines 
and Rice found that the profit shifting elasticity of 2.25. 
The research suggests that if the tax rate observed 
countries 1% larger than foreign parents’ countries, the 
outbound profit shifting is 2.25% from observed 
(reported) profit. 
 
Moreover, Huizinga and Leaven (Huizinga & 
Laeven, 2008) found that elasticity is lower than Hines 
and Rice.  Using Amadeus data for the year 1992 cross-
sectional data, they find the elasticity of 1.31. 
Furthermore, Dischinger found the elasticity of 0.7 
using the panel data form 1995-2005 from Amadeus 
(Dischinger, 2010). Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2017) measure the 
consensus elasticity of all prior research that they 
combined. By using various data, the consensus 
elasticity estimation is 0.8.  
 
Dharmapala stated that recent studies show 
lower elasticity due to the usage of more 
comprehensive and micro-level detailed data 
compared to prior study (Dharmapala, 2014c). 
Furthermore, those earlier studies did not differentiate 
the incentives for inbound and outbound profit shifting. 
Since they only focus on the elasticity of shifted profit, 
not elasticity of inbound or outbound profit-shifting. 
 
Updated research comes from OECD working 
paper shows the different method (Johansson et al., 
2017). The research distinguishes between inbound 
and outbound profit shifting. Johansson used the 
elasticity of Return of Total Assets (ROA) to tax rate 
difference among entities that belong to one MNE 
group. The tax rate difference is the difference between 
the tax rate in the observed country and the tax rate of 
the MNE group. Using pooled OLS panel data on ORBIS 
data form 2000-2010 for G20 and OECD countries, the 
research finds that 1% higher in the observed country 
compared to the average group, lower the ROA by 6% 
in the observed country. 
 
Furthermore, in the same paper, Johansson also 
estimates the effectiveness of anti-avoidance 
regulation (Johansson et al., 2017). His approach is by 
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decomposing tax differences when positive or negative 
to differentiate between incentives for inbound and 
outbound profit shifting. The anti-avoidance will 
interact with positive tax differential. Using the 
classification of the anti-avoidance index from 0 to 8 
(Johansson & Sorbe, 2016) in OECD and G20 countries, 
the research finds that the increase of anti-avoidance 
index by 1 (one) index reduce the outbound profit 
shifting by 3.8% . However, the index does not consider 
the enforcement of the countries. Another caveat of 
this research is that the anti-avoidance rule was based 
only on 2005. Thus the research does not consider year 
by year regulation change. 
 
Another research look at the individual anti-
avoidance regulation rather than on the aggregate 
index. Beer and Loeprick (Beer & Loeprick, 2015) 
researched how transfer pricing documentation 
requirements reduce profit-shifting. The result 
suggests that the introduction of transfer pricing 
documentation requirement reduces the MNE profit 
shifting by 52% (on average) two years after 
documentation regulation enactment. 
 
Marques and Pinho conducted research 
specifically for transfer pricing strictness to European 
MNE, taking into account the enforcement level 
(Marques & Pinho, 2016). By using the data for the year 
2001-2009, this research shows that the elasticity of 
earning before tax to transfer pricing strictness is 1.93, 
while the elasticity to tax difference is 1.74.  
 
There are still few studies evaluating the 
effectiveness of aggregate anti-avoidance. Most 
studies focus on specific individual anti-avoidance. 
Hence, this paper fills the gap by focusing on the 
aggregate level. The methodology used based on 
Johansson’s methodology (Johansson et al., 2017). 
Moreover, this paper brings more in-depth analysis by 
considering year by year change of anti-avoidance 
regime, rather than using one year as a base year as in 
Johansson’s (2017).  
 
2.1. Why ASEAN? 
 
The study on the anti-avoidance impact in ASEAN 
is still rare, although these regions provide new 
material to be studied due to non-harmonized tax 
structure, tax regulation, and the variation of the tax 
rate (Compact, 2013). Also, different resources 
endowment across ASEAN countries determine the 
economic and taxation policy (Institute, 2014). The 
countries discussed in this paper and their respective 
corporate tax rate are as follows:  
Table 1 ASEAN Statutory Corporate Income Tax  
 
Now we have a set of different tax rates. Where 
some countries could become victims of outbound 
profit shifting, and some become the destinations of 
inbound profit shifting. Furthermore, we need to 
evaluate the anti-avoidance index. The index will be 
given according to the level of strictness from the year 
2009 to 2018. By collecting the information from each 
previous studies, publications, official websites, 
regulations, reports from the consulting firm, the 
evaluation of the index are as follows: 
 
2.2. Transfer Pricing Regulation 
 
For the criteria of the Transfer Pricing Regulation 
index, Johansson set specifications based on arm’s 
length and documentation criteria  (Johansson et al., 
2017). The index has given below specification: 
Table 2 Transfer Pricing Classification 
Specification Score Index 
Arm’s Length Principle exists but not stated 
in domestic tax law or no transfer pricing 
documentation requirement. 
0 
Arm’s Length Principle exists and stated in 
domestic tax law, and transfer pricing 
documentation requirements exist, but it is 
not part of the annual tax return. 
1 
Arm’s Length Principle exists and stated in 
domestic tax law, and transfer pricing 
documentation requirements exist and 
required as a part of the annual tax return. 
2 
 
Myanmar, Laos, and Brunei do not have transfer 
pricing regulation in their tax law (Chhiv, 2019; KPMG, 
2013) (Ernst & Young, 2018) (KPMG, 2018b) (Loh, 2018) 
(Zainuddin, 2019). While Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Cambodia has given a score of 1 since their 
transfer pricing documentation requirement is not 
required at the time of annual tax return submission 
(Peerapat, 2019) (Suteeraporncha, 2019) (KPMG, 
2018c) (KPMG, 2013) (KPMG, 2016a) (KPMG, 2016b) 
(Chhiv, 2019). Indonesia enacted documentation 
requirements at the time annual tax return submission 
in 2016 (KPMG, 2018a). Thus, only Singapore and 
Vietnam that has documentation requirements at the 
time of annual tax return (KPMG, 2016c) (Low, 2019) 
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(KPMG, 2018d). The recapitulation score across ASEAN 
as follows: 
Table 3 ASEAN’ Transfer Pricing Index 
 
2.3. Thin Capitalisation Regulation 
For the criteria of Thin Capitalisation index, 
Johansson set the criteria for thin capitalisation as 
follows (Johansson & Sorbe, 2016): 
Table 4 Thin Capitalisation Classification 
Specification Score Index 
No thin capitalisation rule. 0 
Thin capitalisation rule exists 
in the form of debt to equity 
ratio is less strict than 3:1 or 
interest to earnings ratio less 
strict than 30%. 
1 
Thin capitalisation rule exists 
in the form of debt to equity 
ratio is stricter than 3:1 or 
interest to earnings ratio 
stricter than 30%. 
2 
 
Most ASEAN countries do not implement thin 
capitalisation rules. Only Indonesia and Cambodia have 
implemented this regulation. Indonesia enacted a debt 
to equity ratio of 4:1 in 2015 (Delloite, 2018; KPMG, 
2018a), while Cambodia has the limitation of interest 
deduction is 50% of net income (Chhiv, 2019; KPMG, 
2013). 
Table 5 ASEAN’ Thin Capitalisation Index 
 
2.4. Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) Regulation 
 
For the criteria of Controlled Foreign Corporation 
index, Johansson set the criteria as follows (Johansson 
& Sorbe, 2016) (Markle & Robinson, 2012): 
Table 6 Table 6 CFC Classification 
Specification Score Index 
No Controlled Foreign Corporation 
regulation in the country. 0 
A Controlled Foreign Corporation 
Regulation exists. 1 
 
The majority of ASEAN country does not have CFC 
rule in their domestic regulation. It is Only Indonesia 
that has CFC rule implemented (KPMG, 2018a). The 
recapitulation is as follows: 
Table 7 ASEAN’ CFC Index 
 
2.5. General Anti Avoidance Regulation (GAAR) 
 
GAAR’s feature in every country is different, so it 
is hard to quantify the index. Thus, Johansson set the 
specification for GAAR index based on the existence of 
rule as follows: 
Table 8 GAAR Classification 
Specification Score Index 
No General Anti Avoidance Regulation in 
the country. 0 
A General Anti Avoidance Regulation exists. 1 
 
There are only Malaysia and Singapore which have 
GAAR implemented in domestic regulation. Malaysia 
Applied GAAR since 1967, where Singapore Apply GAAR 
in 1988 (KPMG, 2013). 
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Table 9 ASEAN’ GAAR Index 
 
2.6. Tax Treaty Network and Withholding Tax Rate 
 
The criterion based on the number of tax treaties 
and the withholding tax rate on dividend, interest, and 
royalty to the non-resident. Johansson set the criteria 
as follows (Johansson & Sorbe, 2016): 
Table 10 Tax Treaty Network and Withholding Tax 
Rate 
Specification Score Index 
The average tax rate of Dividend, interest, 
royalty is below or equal to 20%, or the 
number of tax treaty network is above 52 
treaties. 
0 
The average tax rate of Dividend, interest, 
royalty is above 20%, and the number of tax 
treaty network is above 52 treaties. 
1 
The average tax rate of Dividend, interest, 
royalty is above 20%, and the number of tax 
treaty network is below 52 treaties. 
2 
 
For this criterion, the tax treaties network will be 
in the current 2018 condition. The score of withholding 
tax rate and tax treaty network for ASEAN countries as 
follows: 
Table 11 ASEAN’ Tax Treaties and WHT Rate Index 
 
2.7. Overall Classification 
 
The overall classification derived by summing up 
all the above indexes. The range of index will be 0-8; the 
results are as follows: 
Table 12 Overall ASEAN Index 
 
A strict anti-avoidance rule corresponds to the 
index between 7 – 8, while relatively strong is 5 – 6. 
Range from 3 – 4   considered moderate, while 0 – 2 is 
considered weak (Johansson & Sorbe, 2016).    
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Theoretical Methodology 
 
In order to analyze the elasticity of profit-shifting, 
we start by understanding how profit-shifting works in 
an MNE. This paper uses a conceptual framework used 
by Hines and Rice (Hines & Rice, 1994), Huizinga and 
Laeven (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), and Fuest et al. 
(Fuest, Riedel, & Riedel, 2011). The framework 
specified that international tax differences among 
countries generate incentives and opportunities for 
MNE to conduct profit-shifting (Huizinga & Laeven, 
2008). 
 
Assume that MNE operated in country k and 
country i where k is any country outside i. Country i is 
ASEAN country, which could be a high tax rate or low 
tax rate compared to Country k. However, the 
interaction between k and i could vary among the 
member of ASEAN country. For example, i is Indonesia, 
and k is Singapore, meaning we asses an affiliated MNE 
located in Indonesia (i) which has affiliation in a 
company in Singapore (k). The statutory CIT rate in 
country k is denoted by tk, while ti denotes the statutory 
CIT rate in the country i. 
 
In order to understand how MNE maximize their 
profit through shifting strategy, this paper thinks from 
two different perspectives, which are the global MNE 
group perspective and individual MNE perspective.  
 
First, we think from the global MNE perspective 
(Fuest et al., 2011). The MNE earn a total profit (πmne) 
from country i and country k. πk denotes profit in 
country k, where πi denotes profit in the country i. The 
total profit of the MNE is πmne = πk + πi.  
 
Thus, the total MNE group globally received the 
total profit after tax ((1-t) πmne  ) which denotes by: 
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(1-t) πmne = (1- tk) πk + (1- ti)                            (1) 
 
After the profit shifting strategy applied, the profit 
after tax ( (1-t) πmneas) for MNE group become: 
 
(1-t) πmneas = (1- tr) (πr + s )  + (1- ti) ( πi – s)        (2) 
 
We assume that to conduct the profit shifting 
strategy, there is a cost to be borne. Consequently the 
MNE profit after tax after considering the cost of profit 
c(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)   shifting as follows: 
 
(1-t) πmneas  = (1- tk) (πk + 𝑆𝑆)  + (1- ti) ( πi – s) - c(𝑆𝑆)          
(3) 
By differentiating (3) with respect to profit shifting 
strategy (S) we have: 
 
                     𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 =  (ti – tk ) = c’(s)        (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the marginal benefit of 
profit shifting strategy should equal to the marginal 
cost of profit shifting strategy. 
 
We assume that there is a tax rate difference 
between tk and ti , where tk < ti. Since we want to focus 
on outbound profit shifting the ASEAN country, we 
focus on the perspective of country i. The tax rate 
difference depicts the incentive for MNE to conduct 
profit shifting from i perspective (Si). This incentive 
leads to inbound and outbound profit shifting that 
follows: 
                           𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 < 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 < 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �     (5) 
Note that the first line is outbound profit shifting 
is positive from the perspective of I ,if the tax rate in i is 
higher than tax rate in k. The second line depicts no 
profit shifting made if the tax rates are the same. The 
last line stated that inbound profit shifting would come 
to i if the tax rate in i is relatively lower than k. 
 
Now, we think from the perspective of the 
individual MNE. Consider a member of MNE in a 
country sample i. Assume Ri is the real profit generated 
in the country i from the firm’s capital and labor. Si is 
outbound profit shifting out from country i. Following 
the work of Hines and Rice (Hines & Rice, 1994) and 
Huizinga and Laeven (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) 
marginal cost of profit shifting is the ratio of shifted 
profit to real profit (Si / Ri ) multiplied by 𝛼𝛼. 𝛼𝛼 is the 
strength of anti-avoidance regulation in a country i 
which also determines the proportion of shifted profit. 
Hence, Huizinga and Laeven (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) 
state that profit shifting cost is   𝑐𝑐(𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼𝛼
2
(𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖) 2
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
.     
     
The logic behind this equation is that the shifting 
cost will be higher if a higher proportion of the profit is 
shifted out of the country i. If Si 100% of Ri, (Si = Ri), all 
profit is shifted out of the country i, Then the shifting 
cost in the form of compliance cost, sanction, penalties, 
reputation would be Si  times the anti-avoidance 
strength α/2 . The stronger the anti-avoidance is, the 
higher the cost. The anti-avoidance rule brings back the 
out-shifted profit, and also imposes penalties and 
sanctions and so on. In the end, if the rule is applied to 
the MNE, the MNE should bring back the Si ¬to country 
i, but also have to pay the sanctions (Huizinga & Laeven, 
2006) (Hines & Rice, 1994). The total amount may be 
much higher than the tax that would be owed on the 
initial amount of profit shifting. However, in a real 
situation, the issues for tax revenues are not that the 
amount of shifted profit but the tax that not being paid 
because of profit-shifting. 
 
Again, the Individual firm in the country i 
maximize after-tax profit by considering outbound 
profit shifting strategy (S_i) which is: 
 max
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
(1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘) − 𝛼𝛼
2
 (𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖) 2
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
�)  (6) 
Note that the amount of shifted profit depends on 
the incentives, and the profit-shifting cost is tax-
deductible since when being audited, the principal tax 
paid is creditable (but not the penalty). Thus, the first-
order condition with respect to profit shifting strategy 
(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) will be: 
 
          𝜕𝜕(1−𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
= � (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘) − 𝛼𝛼 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖� =  0       (7) 
Solving the equation (7) we have 𝛼𝛼 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
=  (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 −
𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘) . We find the same result as equation (4) where the 
marginal cost of profit shifting equal to the differential 
tax rate.  
      𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼  (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 −  𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  )       (8) 
The equation above depicts the marginal after-tax 
profit shifting in i.  While Hines and Rice (Hines & Rice, 
1994) focus only the differential tax rate between 
parent and observed entity, Huizinga and Laeven 
(Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) argues that the profit shifting 
strategy considers all member of the MNE around the 
countries k, taking into account different tax rate in 
specific countries. Hence, solving equation (8) for global 
profit shifting we have: 
  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =  �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼  � ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚          (9) 
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Where 
∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚
 is the unweighted average 
difference of tax rate between the observed entity of 
the MNE. Thus, the reported profit is the accounting 
profit (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟) or the difference between real profit (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) from economic activity and shifted profit (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) , 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  . The expression becomes: 
 
    𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 �1 −  � 1𝛼𝛼 �∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚 �    (10) 
We would like to know the effectiveness of anti-
avoidance regulation as the cost of profit shifting. In the 
above equation, this strength depicted by 𝛼𝛼. While the 
incentives of profit shifting depicted by average 
different of the tax rate (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  ). Hence, the 
hypothesis would be: 
                     
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 < 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚 > 0, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 > 0 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚 = 0 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 0
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 > 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚 < 0 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 < 0⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫
     
(11) 
By decomposing the incentives (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 −
𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  ), Equation (10) states that reported profit will be 
larger (smaller) than real profit if differential tax is 
positive (negative). Another important concept to 
consider is that anti-avoidance regulation (𝛼𝛼) only be 
applicable for tackling outbound profit shifting. Anti-
avoidance has no effect on inbound profit shifting. 
 
3.2. Empirical Methodology  
 
This paper uses an empirical strategy by Hines and 
Rice (1994) which modified by Johansson (2017) to test 
(or apply) the theory above for the ASEAN region. In 
order to estimate (10) we assume the Cobb-Douglass 
Production function where  𝑄𝑄 = 𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽1𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽3. The 
individual firm real profit is the return on capital which 
is  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽3)𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽1𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽3 , where A is the 
productivity of labour, K is capital input, and L is labour 
input. Taking the log of both sides we have real profit 
equation without shifting strategy which is: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛽𝛽3 ) +  𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽2  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿                 (12) 
Then, by substituting (12) into (10) and 
considering profit shifting strategy (11) and differences 
tax rate incentives, 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚
 , we have 
the equation of reported profit of an individual firm in 
their financial report: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛽𝛽3) + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽2  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾 + 𝛽𝛽3  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (13) 
That estimation follows the same model as used in 
previous research (Salvador & A’andria, 2018) (Ratan, 
2015). Furthermore, to estimates the effectiveness of 
anti-avoidance regulation, Johansson et al. Modify the 
above model  (Johansson et al., 2017) to embed the 
strength of the anti-avoidance regulation index (AAR), 
which we have calculated earlier for ASEAN. By 
decomposing the incentives 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 when it is positive 
and negative, as firm will react differently according to 
equation (5) and equation (11). The modified model is 
as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑟𝑟 = 𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽3  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 +𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚  𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝜖𝜖 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 (14) 
Table 13 List of Variables 
Variables Explanation 
Log 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = The logarithm of Reported Profit 
before tax, as stated in Financial 
Report of the individual entity in 
the country i. 
𝛽𝛽0 = Equal to 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝛽𝛽3) , A 
constant. 
𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴 = The logarithm of productivity of 
the individual entity in the 
country i. Proxied by per capita 
GDP (Hines & Rice, 1994). 
𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐾𝐾  = The logarithm of the capital of 
individual entity. Proxied by 
total assets. 
𝛽𝛽3  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝐿  = The logarithm of labor of 
individual entity, proxied by cost 
of employee. 
𝛽𝛽4  
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 The positive result of average 
difference between corporate 
Income Tax Rate of a country i 
and country k. or 
∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚
> 0, this variable 
serves as an incentive for 
Outbound Profit Shifting. If the 
result is negative, the value will 
be zero. 
𝛽𝛽5  
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    = The negative result of average difference between corporate Income Tax Rate of a country i 
and country k. 
∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 )𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ≠𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚
 < 0, this variable 
serves as an incentive for 
Inbound Profit Shifting. If the 
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Variables Explanation 
result is positive, the value will 
be zero. 
 𝛽𝛽6  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 = The strength of anti-avoidance 
Regulation in Country i, taking 
into consideration the changing 
over time.  
𝛽𝛽7  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  
𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
= An interaction variable between 
the strength of anti-avoidance 
and incentives for outbound 
profit shifting. A variable of 
Interest that describes the 
effectiveness of anti-avoidance. 
𝛽𝛽8 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 = A Country Dummy. Cambodia as 
a base dummy. 
𝛽𝛽9 𝑋𝑋 = The set of control variables, 
which consists of 
macroeconomic variables such 
as; Regulatory Index, exchange 
rate, inflation, GDP growth rate. 
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓,𝑔𝑔,𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚 = Residual Term. 
 
The estimation uses panel data estimation 
following the method used in prior research (Fuest et 
al., 2011; Huizinga & Laeven, 2006; Johansson et al., 
2017; Purba, 2018; Ratan, 2015). The elasticity of 
outbound profit shifting is depicted in 𝛽𝛽4, while the 
effectiveness of anti-avoidance regulation will be 
represented in 𝛽𝛽7. 𝛽𝛽7  is expected to have a positive sign 
if strong anti-avoidance regulation can reduce profit 
shifting. The overall effect of anti-avoidance regulation 
is the summation of(𝛽𝛽4 +  𝛽𝛽7). 
 
4. DATA 
 
The company micro-level data is sourced from 
ORBIS for the year 2009-2018, which provided by 
Bureau Van Dijk.  ORBIS provides reported financial 
reports of the company, and the structure of their MNE 
group around the world. The coverage year 2009-2018 
is chosen to include the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) initiatives in 2015. In this coverage year, many 
countries have redesigned their anti-avoidance 
regulation. The rest of the data will is sourced from 
several sources, for example, OECD data, UN data, 
UNCTAD, and several official reports from consulting 
firms. The regulatory index as a control for 
enforcement is sourced from the World Bank 
Regulatory index. 
 
ORBIS is chosen because it provides reported 
financial reports of individual companies. However, 
several processes of cleaning need to be done on the 
data before conducting the regression process. The 
step of the cleaning process is as follows: 
 
Table 14 Cleaning Process 
No. Step 
Number of 
Observatio
ns 
% of 
Step 1 Reason 
1 
Initial 
Population 
of ORBIS 
307,563,635 100% - 
2 
Excluding 
Independen
ce firms 
211,858,469 68% 
Since 
cross 
border 
profit 
shifting 
only 
happen 
in 
affiliated 
firms. 
Criteria of 
25% 
Ownershi
p (directly 
or 
indirectly) 
is used to 
determin
e an 
affiliated 
company. 
3 
Excluding 
non-ASEAN 
firms. 
2,915,067 0.948% - 
4 
Excluding 
firms with a 
consolidate
d financial 
report 
112,347 0.037% 
The 
financial 
report 
should be 
on 
individual 
firm 
report. 
5 
Excluding 
year outside 
2009-2018 
99,646 0.032% - 
6 
Excluding 
firm with 
incomplete 
financial 
information 
85,136 0.028% - 
7 
Manual 
Cleansing 
which 
consists of: 
18,529 0.006% 
The 
cleansing 
process 
following 
the step 
conducte
d by 
Johansso
n (2017). 
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No. Step 
Number of 
Observatio
ns 
% of 
Step 1 Reason 
a. Excluding 
2.5% of 
top and 
bottom 
ratio. 
b. Excluding 
loss-
making 
firms. 
c. Exclude 
domestic 
only MNE 
firms. 
d. Excluding 
firms with 
negative 
tax 
payment. 
8 Final Sample 18,529 0.006% 
The 
Number 
of Entitiy 
 
In the final result, we have population of 18,529  
ASEAN MNE entities to be analyzed using equation 14. 
The covered period is 2009 to 2018. 
 
5. RESULT 
 
The estimation result of equation 14 to the 
population sample are as follows: 
Table 15 Estimation Result 
 Estimation of 
the 
effectiveness 
of anti-
avoidance 
(equation 14) 
Estimation of 
the 
effectiveness of 
anti-avoidance 
with an index 
level 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log of 
reported 
profit 
Log of reported 
profit 
Constant 2.776*** 
(0.129) 
2.634*** 
(0.092) 
Log of GDP per 
capita 
 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.02 
(0.009) 
Log of total 
asset 
 
0.578*** 
(0.003) 
0.578*** 
(0.003) 
Log of 
employee cost 
 
0.341*** 
(0.0051) 
0.341*** 
(0.0051) 
Positive tax 
rate different 
-1.822*** 
(0.637) 
-1.657*** 
(0.654) 
 Estimation of 
the 
effectiveness 
of anti-
avoidance 
(equation 14) 
Estimation of 
the 
effectiveness of 
anti-avoidance 
with an index 
level 
 
Negative tax 
rate different 
 
1.368*** 
(0.124) 
1.373*** 
(0.124) 
Anti-avoidance 
regulation 
Index 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-.0.019*** 
(0.003) 
Anti-avoidance 
regulation 
index times 
positive tax 
rate different 
 
0.551*** 
(0.214) 
0.497** 
(0.219) 
Index of 2  0.134*** 
(0.016) 
Index of 3  0.386** 
(0.015) 
Index of 4  0.367* 
(0.018) 
Index of 5  0.238* 
(0.181) 
   
Regulatory 
Index 
 
-0.064 
(0.041) 
-0.065 
(0.019) 
GDP growth 
rate 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Inflation rate 
 
-0.004 
(0.0020) 
-0.003 
(0.0020) 
Exchange rate 
 
-0.0001*** 
(9.02e-07) 
-0.0001 
(9.02e-07) 
Indonesia 
 
Laos 
 
Malaysia 
 
Philippines 
 
Singapore 
 
Thailand 
 
Vietnam 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
0.17 
(0.16) 
-0.26 
(0.12) 
-0.44** 
(0.17) 
-0.16 
(0.11) 
0.11** 
(0.051) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
Ommited 
 
0.18** 
(0.04) 
-029 
(0.24) 
Observations 54,599 54,599 
R-Squared 0.8243 0.8284 
Adjusted   0.7950 0.7950 
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The fixed-Effect used as an estimation Method. *** indicates 
significance at 1%. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates 
significance at 10%. All coefficient estimated in robust 
standard error, I have conducted F-test, Hausman Test, 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, and concluded the fixed-effect 
method is the most appropriate method. 
6. CONCLUSION AND CAVEATS 
 
From the table above, we can conclude that a 1% 
positive tax rate difference from ASEAN country to 
average other MNE group leads to the outbound profit 
shifting out from ASEAN country by 1.822% MNE firm’s 
profit on average. In addition to that, a 1% negative tax 
rate difference will bring 1.368% inbound profit shifting 
into  ASEAN on average.  
 
This outbound profit shifting estimation is higher 
than in previous research (0.8%) (Heckemeyer & 
Overesch, 2017). However, it is almost similar to  Hines 
and Rice (Hines & Rice, 1994), and Grubert and Mutti 
(Hines & Rice, 1994). One of the reasons is that the 
majority of ASEAN countries are developing country 
which is more prone to outbound profit shifting (Fuest 
et al., 2011).  
 
In order to calculate the effectiveness of anti-
avoidance, we summarize the equation as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑟𝑟 = 2.776 + 0.019  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 0.578 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 0.341  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 − 1.822 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 1.368 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚    −0.019 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 0.551 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 −0.064 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 0.004 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 −0.00001 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 +  ….          (15) 
 
Using the above results, we can estimate the 
effect of the profit with respect to the positive tax rate 
different: 
 
𝜕𝜕 log 𝑅𝑅 𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  =  −1.822 +  0.551 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  
(16) 
From equation (16), the net impact of strength 
anti-avoidance is 1.271% (-1.822 +0.551) on average. 
The result means that ASEAN countries still suffer from 
outbound profit shifting by 1.271% from every 1% 
positive difference and 1 (one) index of anti-avoidance.  
 
From each index level, The most significant impact 
is achieved when the index elevates from 2 to 3, which 
is 0.388%. After that, the impact shows a decreasing 
result. 
 
Another question is to answer is how much the 
theoretical average level of the anti-avoidance index is 
effective in reducing profit shifting to zero on average. 
From equation (16) and set that to 0, we can derive the 
level of anti-avoidance by: 
 
−1.822 +  0.551 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 = 0 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 = 1.8220.551 = 3.3 (17) 
It is quite a surprising result that the effective level 
of the index is 3.3, which is considered a moderately-
strong level (Johansson & Sorbe, 2016). Hence 
theoretically, the level of moderately-strong anti-
avoidance is effective in reducing outbound profit 
shifting to zero on average.  
 
From the estimation results, a moderately strong 
(between 3 and 4) anti-avoidance index is sufficiently 
effective. Moreover, too strict anti-avoidance will have 
a decreasing effect. The highest level of index belongs 
to Indonesia (index of 5), while the majority of ASEAN 
is between 2 and 3.  
 
However, having the highest level of the index 
does not mean that Indonesia has benefited from it. 
The result shows that Indonesia is one of the countries 
besides Vietnam, which severely impacted by 
outbound profit-shifting Vietnam’s level of anti-
avoidance is relatively weak compared to the effective 
level, while Indonesia’s level of anti-avoidance is too 
high compared to the effective level. 
 
Besides, some countries do not affect by 
outbound profit-shifting while maintaining a relatively 
low level of anti-avoidance. Singapore and Thailand are 
the countries with relatively below the level of anti-
avoidance, but they are not negatively impacted or 
having a lower impact compared to other countries.  
 
We can conclude that in designing the anti-
avoidance in ASEAN, the strength of anti-avoidance 
should not be too strict. Otherwise, the effect would be 
ineffective. 
 
From the policy point of view, We can conclude 
that in designing the anti-avoidance in ASEAN, the 
strength of anti-avoidance should not be too strict, not 
too low. Otherwise, the effect would be ineffective. A 
level of moderately strong is enough to generate an 
effective level. Thus, the tax authority needs to focus 
on anti-avoidance, which targets specific transactions 
that are most often conducted by the MNE. 
 
One of the caveats of this paper lies in the 
availability of the data. ORBIS is considered the best 
firm-level data provider now but still does not 
represent the whole population of the whole MNE. The 
level of availability of a firm-level in each country is 
different. It is also found that the sample does not 
represent all ASEAN countries since not all ASEAN 
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countries available in ORBIS (No data for Timor-Leste, 
and very little data of Myanmar and Cambodia).  
 
Another caveat is that the group structure data in 
ORBIS stated only in the recent data.  ORBIS does not 
provide historical data; for example, there is no data of 
the time indicating the MNE group acquire another 
member, or whether there was group restructuring 
within the covered years. This could result in bias in 
calculating tax rates difference. 
 
Moreover, the usage of statutory corporate 
income tax rate different has a potential bias, since the 
MNE put more consideration in the effective tax rate. 
Low effective tax rate combined by other tax benefits 
such as tax sparring,  tax incentives, has a stronger 
impact than the mere differential statutory tax rate. But 
the effective tax rate is unobservable since only 
companies and the tax authority that has information. 
 
In addition, the endogeneity of tax policy is also an 
important thing to consider. It is a high possibility that 
companies choose the location of the affiliated party by 
considering the tax policy (tax haven hypothesis). As we 
have discussed, tax competition to attract FDI allows 
the MNE to choose their location based on the 
attractiveness given by specific countries such as tax 
holiday, tax allowance, and other types of tax 
incentives.  
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